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A “FULL AND FAIR” TRIAL:  
CAN THE EXECUTIVE ENSURE IT ALONE? 
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TRIALS 
BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY 
BY JENNIFER A. LOHR* 
“If, as may be hoped, we are now to enter upon a new era of law in 
the world, it becomes more important than ever before for the na-
tions creating that system to observe their greatest traditions of ad-
ministering justice . . . both in their own judging and in their new 
creation.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of inter-
national terrorism against the United States.”2  Pursuant to this au-
thorization, military operations were soon initiated in Afghanistan 
against al Qaeda and the Taliban.3  As most of the country and Con-
gress were focused on repairing damaged landscapes and senses of se-
curity at home in addition to the impending conflict in Afghanistan, 
select members of the Executive Branch were involved in drafting a 
plan for bringing justice to those involved in terrorism against the 
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 1. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 42 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter “Authorization for Use of Military 
Force”]. 
 3. See, e.g., Vernon Loeb, Second Day of Strikes Includes Searching For Mobile Targets; 
U.S. Seeks Taliban Troops on the Run, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2001, at A8 (describing the first two 
days of military action in Afghanistan). 
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United States.4  This plan was outlined in the President’s Military Or-
der of November 13, 2001 [hereinafter “Military Order”].5 
As early as January of 2002, individuals captured in Afghanistan 
and suspected of terrorist activities were brought to the detention fa-
cility set up by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, Cuba.6  Just as quickly, the legality of the detentions and trials 
by commission were called into question both at home and abroad.  
Though many controversies and legal challenges have arisen concern-
ing the detention and trial of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo 
Bay, an issue that has yet to be clearly addressed is what will happen 
at the end of a successful trial by Military Commission. 
President Bush’s Military Order precludes judicial review of any 
type for those individuals falling under the Military Order.7  However, 
the Supreme Court held in June of 2004 that statutory habeas review 
will be available in the federal courts to challenge detention in Guan-
tanamo Bay.8  Further, even case law cited by the Government as 
precedent for the use of military tribunals or commissions shows im-
plicit past support for the use of federal habeas actions to challenge 
the legality of the tribunals and their jurisdiction over the individuals 
subject to trial in territories within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.9  Although this case law purported to limit such review to ju-
risdictional questions only, the outer limit of federal court jurisdiction 
 
 4. See Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2004, at A1 (discussing the “aggressive approach” developed in secrecy by a small group of 
White House officials which enabled the military to detain and prosecute foreign suspects, in-
cluding those held at Guantanamo Bay). 
 5. Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (entitled, “Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”) [hereinafter “Military Or-
der”]. 
 6. Jim Garamone, Joint Task Force Set Up in Cuba to Oversee Al Qaeda Detainees, 
AMER. FORCES INFO. SERV., Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Jan2002/n01112002_20020111.html. 
 7. Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 7(b). 
 8. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004). 
 9. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78, 785 (1950) (addressing the constitu-
tionality of military trials of nonresident enemy aliens in Nanking, China , even while finding 
that such individuals had no constitutional right to assert a federal habeas challenge to the tri-
als).  Such habeas claims were also used to challenge the legality of World War II military trials 
taking place in the United States or its insular possessions.  See generally In re Yamashita, 327 
U.S. 1 (1946) (addressing trial of Japanese General by military commission in the Philipines); 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (addressing trial of Nazi saboteurs by military commission in 
the United States).  Similarly, statutory habeas actions are now being used to challenge the le-
gality of the current commissions and the designation of certain individuals for trial under their 
jurisdiction prior to the commencement of trial.  See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 
152 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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over the Guantanamo Bay detainees was left open by the Supreme 
Court in Rasul.10 
This note seeks to address the level and type of judicial review 
that will be available after the completion of a Military Commission 
trial.  For purposes of addressing this issue, the constitutionality of 
the use of commissions to try detainees will be assumed.  It will be ar-
gued that, at a minimum, federal habeas jurisdiction must be available 
to satisfy both national and international law.  However, ideally a 
more thorough form of judicial review should be available, to avoid 
separation of powers problems and to satisfy domestic and interna-
tional due process guarantees.  Further, from a normative perspec-
tive, allowing judicial review in the form of appellate jurisdiction over 
the procedure and legal findings of the Commissions would be desir-
able, as it would lend credibility and transparency to procedures that 
have thus far been wrought with controversy. 
II.  PROCEDURES FOR MILITARY  
COMMISSIONS AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
The Military Order sets forth procedures for the detention and 
trial of individuals who are not citizens of the United States and who 
are determined by the President to be a member of al Qaeda, and 
have “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of 
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore” or “know-
ingly harbored [such] individuals.”11  Such individuals are to be de-
tained in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Secretary of 
Defense,12 and “when tried, be tried by military commission for any 
and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is 
alleged to have committed.”13 
The Military Order delegates to the Secretary of Defense the re-
sponsibility to issue “such orders and regulations” necessary to gov-
ern the military commissions, including but not limited to “rules for 
the conduct of the proceedings of the military commissions, including 
pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of 
process, and qualifications of attorneys,” providing that at a minimum 
 
 10. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699. 
 11. Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 2(a)(1). 
 12. Id. at sec. 3. 
 13. Id. at sec. 4(a). 
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detainees would receive a “full and fair trial.”14  Review and final de-
cision on any trial would be performed by the President or the Secre-
tary of Defense.15  Finally, the Military Order provides that military 
commissions shall have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to offenses 
by individuals subject to the order, and that such individuals “shall 
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, di-
rectly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought 
on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any 
state thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any interna-
tional tribunal.”16 
The Secretary of Defense issued regulations setting forth the 
procedures for commissions established pursuant to the Military Or-
der.17  These regulations provide for appointment of the members of 
each Commission, including a Presiding Officer, by the Appointing 
Authority, a designee of the Secretary of Defense.18  The Presiding 
Officer heads the proceedings of the Commission.19  A record of the 
trial is to be made by the Commission and authenticated by the Pre-
siding officer.20  Upon completion of trial, this record is to be trans-
mitted to the Appointing Authority or to a Review Panel if the Secre-
tary of Defense is acting as the Appointing Authority.21  The 
Appointing Authority performs an administrative review of the re-
cord of trial, and, if satisfied that the proceedings were administra-
 
 14. Id. at sec. 4(b)-(c).  Authority for this provision is derived from section 836 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which allows the President to prescribe similar proce-
dural rules and regulations for cases arising under the UCMJ which are triable in courts-martial, 
military commissions and other military tribunals.  10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).  Principles of law 
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in U.S. district courts shall be applied, in so far as 
considered practicable by the President.  Id.  However, regulations prescribed may not be con-
trary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ.  Id. 
 15. Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 4(c)(8). 
 16. Id. at sec. 7(b). 
 17. 32 C.F.R. §§ 9–17. 
 18. Id. at §§ 9.2, 9.4.  Each Commission is to have between three and seven members.  Id. 
at § 9.4(a)(2).  Each member is to be a commissioned officer of the United States armed forces 
(‘Military Officers’).  Id. at § 9.4(a)(3).  The Presiding Officer is to be a judge advocate of any 
United States armed force.  Id. at § 9.4(a)(4).  Members may be removed by the Appointing 
Authority for good cause.  Id. at § 9.4(a)(3). 
 19. Id. at § 9.4(a)(4).  See also id. at § 9.4(a)(5) (listing duties of the Presiding Officer). 
 20. Id. at § 9.6(h)(1). 
 21. Id.  The Review Panel shall consist of three Military Officers, at least one of whom 
shall have experience as a judge, appointed by the Secretary of Defense.  Id. at § 9.6(h)(4). 
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tively complete, transmits the record of trial to the Review Panel.22  
The Review Panel then reviews the record of trial and within thirty 
days either forwards the case to the Secretary of Defense with a rec-
ommendation as to disposition or returns the case to the Appointing 
Authority for further proceedings.23  The Secretary of Defense then 
performs a similar review of the record, either returning the case for 
further proceedings, forwarding it to the President with a recommen-
dation as to disposition, or making the final determination if desig-
nated by the President to perform this function.24 
Trial by the Commission commences when the Appointing Au-
thority refers the charges of an individual who is subject to the Mili-
tary Order to the Commission.25  On July 3, 2003, the President de-
termined that six detainees would be eligible for trial by Military 
Commission.26  At the date of this note, four detainees have been des-
ignated for trial by the Appointing Authority, although fifteen have 
now been determined eligible by the President.27  The progress of the 
trials has been delayed by motions to the Commissions themselves, as 
well as challenges in the United States Federal Courts.  In November 
of 2004, the decision by the United States District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld28 brought into 
question further progress by the Commissions.29  For purposes of this 
note, which seeks only to address post-trial review of the Military 
 
 22. Id. at § 9.6(h)(3).  If the Appointing Authority is not satisfied that the proceedings of 
the Commission were administratively complete, the case shall be returned for any necessary 
supplementary proceedings.  Id. 
 23. Id. at § 9.6(h)(4).  During this review, the Review Panel may, in its discretion, review 
any written submissions from the Prosecution and the Defense.  Id.  Deliberations are to take 
place in closed conference.  Id.  Any variance from the procedures spelled out in the Depart-
ment of Defense’s regulations shall be disregarded where they “would not materially have af-
fected the outcome of the trial before the Commission.”  Id. 
 24. Id. at § 9.6(h)(5)–(6). 
 25. Id. at § 9.2. 
 26. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, President Determines Enemy Combatants 
Subject to His Military Order ( July 3, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html. 
 27. Guantanamo Bay Detainees Legal Update, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_legal.htm (last modified Nov. 9, 
2004). 
 28. 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 29. The four cases designated for trial are currently in abeyance, pending the outcome of 
the federal litigation.  Kathleen Rhem, Parties Still Working Behind the Scenes on Military 
Commissions, AMER. FORCES INFO. SERV., Mar. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/2005 
0308_118.html. 
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Commissions, the ongoing challenges to the constitutionality of the 
Military Commissions will be illustrative of considerations that will be 
important in determining the availability and scope of post-trial judi-
cial review. 
III.  HISTORICAL USE OF JUDICIAL  
OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
Historically, the United States has used military commissions 
while in the battlefield to try spies, saboteurs, and other violations of 
the laws of war.30  Additionally, military commissions have been used 
in occupied territories to try common crimes where local courts may 
be insufficient, or to fill a legal vacuum where armed conflict disables 
the civil courts.31  The use of military commissions as an “exception to 
the ‘preferred’ method of civilian trial [was] thus justified by neces-
sity” and often consisted of impromptu proceedings to distribute jus-
tice on the battlefield.32  The use of military commissions by the 
United States in recent times has been limited, and the key cases 
dealing with the constitutionality of military commissions arose in re-
gards to their use during the Civil War and World War II. 
In Ex parte Milligan,33 the Supreme Court held that military 
commissions organized during the civil war, in a state not invaded or 
engaged in rebellion, in which the federal courts were open and exer-
cising their jurisdiction, had no jurisdiction to try, convict, or sentence 
a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebellious state, a prisoner of 
war, nor a person in the military.34  Thus, while Milligan’s holding was 
limited to the trial of citizens by military commissions, it also pro-
vided precedent for judicial inquiry into the legality of the authority 
and jurisdiction of military commissions,35 an inquiry that is evident in 
the following cases dealing with World War II military commissions. 
During World War II, the Court had several opportunities to 
deal with the military commissions.  First, in 1942 the Court held con-
 
 30. STEPHEN DYCUS, ET. AL, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, 889 (3d ed. 2002). 
 31. Id. at 889, 901.  See Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and the War Power, 2 MINN. L. REV. 
110, 123 (1918) (describing “time of war” as meaning “when the ordinary courts are not in the 
usual and open exercise of their functions”). 
 32. DYCUS, supra note 30, at 901.  See also Fletcher, supra note 31, at 116–17 (stating that 
the majority in Milligan took the view that war powers used to conduct military commissions 
were founded upon necessity, and therefore were justified in front of the judiciary only by ne-
cessity). 
 33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866). 
 34. Id. at 118, 121–22. 
 35. Id. at 118; Fletcher, supra note 31, at 115–17. 
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stitutional President Roosevelt’s military order establishing military 
commissions to try eight Nazi saboteurs captured on U.S. soil, in Ex 
parte Quirin.36  While the 1942 Military Order was directed specifi-
cally at the eight Nazi defendants,37 on the same day, President Roo-
sevelt issued a Proclamation subjecting to the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals all “subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with 
the United States” who entered or attempted to enter United States 
territory during a time of war and were charged with violations of 
war.38  It is also notable that the President’s Proclamation stated “such 
persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or pro-
ceeding sought on their behalf” in federal or state courts.39 
In hearing petitioners’ post-conviction habeas claim, even while 
acknowledging the general prohibition of judicial review contained in 
the Proclamation, the Court rejected the Government’s claim that it 
could not consider whether the application of the Proclamation to the 
defendants in question was proper or whether their trial by military 
commission was unconstitutional.40  However, finding that the military 
commissions were constitutional and had exercised proper jurisdic-
tion over the defendants, the Court stated that it would not consider 
other unrelated issues and was unconcerned with “any question of the 
guilt or innocence” of the defendants.41  Further, 
[T]he detention and trial of petitioners—ordered by the President 
in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of 
the Army in time of war and of grave public danger—are not to be 
set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in 
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally 
enacted.42 
Therefore, while offering support for a review of the propriety of 
military commissions and their jurisdiction over defendants, Quirin 
 
 36. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942). 
 37. Appointment of a Military Commission, Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 
2, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Military Order]. 
 38. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Proclama-
tion]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24–25. 
 41. Id. at 25. 
 42. Id.  The court rejected petitioners’ argument that Milligan stood for the rule that the 
law of war could not be applied to citizens in states in which “the courts are open and their 
process unobstructed,” finding that that ruling was limited to the particular facts of that case.  
Id. at 45 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121). 
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also represents support for deference to the authority of the President 
to create military tribunals in a time of war.43 
Four years later, the Court denied a habeas petition from the 
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial 
Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, who had been tried and 
convicted for violation of the laws of war by a military commission in 
the Philippines, in In re Yamashita.44  There, the petitioner sought ha-
beas review claiming that the military commission was without lawful 
authority or jurisdiction because it was convened after hostilities be-
tween the United States and Japan had ended, failed to charge peti-
tioner with a violation of the law of war, and did not provide a fair 
trial in violation of the laws of war, the Geneva Convention, and the 
Fifth Amendment.45  As in Quirin, the Court emphasized that on ap-
plication for habeas corpus concern was not with the guilt or inno-
cence of the petitioner, but only with the lawful power of the commis-
sion to try the petitioner for the offense charged.46  So long as the 
authority of the commission was lawful, correction of any errors of 
decision was not for the Court to perform, but rather for the military 
authorities who alone had been authorized to review the decisions.47  
Regardless, as in Quirin, the Court went on to address the substantive 
nature of the petitioner’s claims, though holding against him.48 
Finally, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,49 the Court addressed the “ju-
risdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authori-
 
 43. It should be noted that the Court in Quirin repeatedly cited Congressional authority for 
creating commissions, 317 U.S. at 26–30, and that many scholars have used this point, in addi-
tion to the formal declaration of war, to distinguish the Quirin commissions from the current 
commissions.  Additionally, consideration of additional factors such as the public reaction to the 
capture of the saboteurs, as well as executive pressure on the court, provide an interesting lens 
from which to view the Quirin Court’s decision.  See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Com-
ment, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 261, 271 (2002) (listing examples of public and media outcry over judicial interven-
tion into military commissions and finding that “[i]n the context of the events of late 1942, the 
decision in Quirin to limit Milligan and to uphold the validity of Roosevelt’s Military Commis-
sion was not viewed as a big deal”).  See infra note 92 and accompanying text for discussion of 
these issues in regards to the current commissions. 
 44. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1946). 
 45. Id. at 5–6. 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 25 (concluding that “the order convening the commission was a lawful order, 
that the commission was lawfully constituted, that petitioner was charged with violation of the 
law of war, and that the commission had authority to proceed with the trial, and in doing so did 
not violate any military, statutory, or constitutional command”). 
 49. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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ties in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”50  Petitioners in this case 
were twenty-one German nationals who were captured while engag-
ing in the service of German armed forces in China after the surren-
der of Germany and convicted of violating laws of war by a military 
commission constituted by the U.S. Commanding General at Nank-
ing, China.51  After the conviction, the sentences were duly reviewed 
and approved by military approving authority, upon which time the 
prisoners were repatriated to serve their sentences at Landsberg 
Prison in Germany.52  The prisoners then petitioned for writs of ha-
beas corpus, claiming that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment 
were unconstitutional and violated the Geneva Convention governing 
treatment of prisoners of war.53 
In denying the petitions, the court stated that “the nonresident 
enemy alien . . . does not have even . . . qualified access to our courts, 
for he neither has . . . claims upon our institutions nor could his use of 
them fail to be helpful to the enemy.”54  Yet, even while denying ha-
beas, the court acknowledged that “the doors of our courts have not 
been summarily closed upon these prisoners.”55  First, hearings had 
been provided to determine whether the right to habeas existed for 
the petitioners.56  Additionally, although the Court denied that peti-
tioners had the right to challenge the constitutionality of the military 
commissions, it went on to evaluate the legality of the commissions 
under the constitution and the Geneva Conventions, finding the 
commissions proper under both.57 
 
 50. Id. at 765. 
 51. Id. at 765–66. 
 52. Id. at 766. 
 53. Id. at 767.  Specifically, the petitioners claimed violations of Articles I and III, and the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.  Id. 
 54. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950).  The Court went on to find six factors 
important to the finding that petitioners had no constitutional right to habeas review: that they 
were enemy aliens; had never been or resided in the U. S.; were captured outside of U.S. terri-
tory and held there in military custody as prisoners of war; were tried and convicted by a mili-
tary commission sitting outside of the U.S.; were charged with and tried for offenses against laws 
of war committed outside the U.S.; and were at all times imprisoned outside of the U.S.  Id. at 
777. 
 55. Id. at 780. 
 56. Id. at 781. 
 57. See id. at 782-90.  See also id at 794 (Black, J., dissenting) (reading Quirin and Yama-
shita to stand for the proposition that enemy aliens can at least challenge the legality of their 
commissions in federal court). 
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IV.  JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF DETENTIONS  
AND PROCEEDINGS AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
As discussed, supra Part III, military tribunals have not been sub-
ject to judicial review throughout history, for both legal and practical 
reasons.  However, just as the legal landscape has changed in the 
sixty-plus years since Ex parte Quirin and Johnson v. Eisentrager, so 
has the nature of warfare and national security changed from a prac-
tical standpoint.  From a legal perspective, changes in international 
law such as the worldwide ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 
1949, and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
ratified by the United States in 1994, as well as the domestic adoption 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950 and domestic exten-
sions of criminal law, are all factors that narrow the relevance of deci-
sions limiting judicial review of military commissions during World 
War II.58  From a practical standpoint, the United States has not been 
involved in a formally declared war since World War II.  The current 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq involve both enemy armed forces 
and unlawful enemy combatants or insurgents.59  Finally, the greater 
“War on Terror” has no definable boundaries, making the world its 
battlefield with no likelihood of a definitive conclusion.60  Given these 
changes, it is difficult to apply the traditional justifications for, as well 
as limitations on, military commissions when questions arise about 
the constitutionality of detention and trial of detainees in Guan-
tanamo Bay. 
The first set of issues was decided by the Supreme Court in June 
of 2004, when it held that both citizen and alien detainees had a statu-
tory right to petition for habeas review of the legality of their deten-
tion and classification as enemy combatants.61  The Court’s holding in 
 
 58. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Military Attorneys Assigned to the Defense in the Office of 
Military Commissions as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 21–29, Al Odah v. 
United States, 2004 WL 96765 (2004) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Military Commission De-
fense Attorneys]. 
 59. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on 
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346 (2002) (suggesting four possibilities for characterizing the 
post-September 11 “war” and its parties: (1) a metaphorical “war on terrorism,” of worldwide 
scope and indefinite duration; (2) an international armed conflict against Al Qaeda as a quasi-
state; (3) an international armed conflict in Afghanistan, though not against Afghanistan; and 
(4) a proxy war “in the context of the quarter-century-old internal armed conflict in Afghani-
stan”). 
 60. Id. at 346–47. 
 61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004) (“[D]ue process demands that a citizen 
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest 
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
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Rasul v. Bush, which left open “[w]hether and what further proceed-
ings may become necessary” after the Government responds to claims 
that detainees are being held illegally,62 will have important impacts 
upon the availability of judicial review for alien detainees determined 
to be eligible for trial by military commission. 
In rejecting the Government’s claim that, under Eisentrager, the 
Court could not review the claims of foreign nationals held in Guan-
tanamo Bay, the majority distinguished the situation of the current 
detainees to those in Eisentrager.  Important to the Court was the dis-
tinction that those detained in Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the Mili-
tary Order were not nationals of countries at war with the United 
States, were never charged or convicted of wrong, were never af-
forded access to any tribunal, and in fact denied engaging in or plot-
ting acts of aggression against the United States.63  Further, the Court 
distinguished Guantanamo Bay from the Landsberg prison in Ger-
many, finding that the detainees were imprisoned in territory under 
the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States.64  Ulti-
mately, however, the Court based its decision on the fact that the Eis-
entrager court addressed whether detainees had a constitutional right 
to habeas, while in this case “subsequent decisions of [the] Court have 
filled the statutory gap that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to 
‘fundamentals,’” thus allowing for a statutory right to habeas review 
extending to Guantanamo Bay.65 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, expressing concern 
that the majority’s approach failed to follow the framework of Eisen-
trager, and that the habeas petition “was not within the proper realm 
of the judicial power,” but rather “concerned matters within the ex-
clusive province of the Executive, or the Executive and Congress, to 
determine.”66  Thus, from Eisentrager comes the indication “that there 
is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judici-
ary may not enter.”67  However, a “necessary corollary” to this princi-
ple is that circumstances will exist in which courts maintain the power 
 
2686, 2696 (2004) (“Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at [Guantanamo Bay] 
is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.”). 
 62. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699. 
 63. Id. at 2693. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2695. 
 66. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 2700. 
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and responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even 
where military affairs are implicated.68 
Therefore, the court must perform an initial inquiry into the gen-
eral circumstances of the detention to determine whether to entertain 
a habeas petition.69  In this case, two critical facts distinguished Guan-
tanamo detainees from the situation in Eisentrager.  First, the fact that 
“Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States terri-
tory, and . . . one far removed from any hostilities,” supported the 
claim of the detainees.70  Second, unlike the prisoners in Eisentrager, 
who were already determined to be enemy combatants through mili-
tary commission procedures, the Guantanamo detainees were being 
held indefinitely, with no procedure to determine their status.71  For 
those reasons, Justice Kennedy supported federal court jurisdiction to 
determine the legality of detentions in this case, while stopping short 
of supporting “automatic statutory authority” for habeas claims 
brought by persons located outside of the United States.72 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, dissented, disagreeing with the Court’s analysis of habeas 
case law subsequent to Eisentrager and finding that the Court’s ruling 
contradicted Eisentrager, “a half-century-old precedent on which the 
military undoubtedly relied.”73  The dissent further warned that the 
Court’s decision would have breathtaking consequences, permitting 
any alien captured in a foreign theatre of war to bring a habeas peti-
tion against the Secretary of Defense.74 
The ramifications of the Rasul decision on the treatment of de-
tainees at Guantanamo were almost immediately seen.  While the 
Government set up a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to provide 
the procedure and legal classification that the Court had found lack-
ing,75 attorneys for the detainees brought forth habeas petitions in re-
gards to the detentions.76  For some detainees who faced trial by mili-
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
 72. Id. at 2701. 
 73. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 2706. 
 75. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, First Combatant Status Tribunal Conducted 
at Guantanamo Today (July 30, 2004), at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040730-
1076.html. 
 76. The Ninth Circuit decided that the proper venue for such proceedings is the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2004).  As of 
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tary commission, habeas petitions were used to preemptively chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the commissions in addition to their de-
tention.77  In November, the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia issued a ruling that “shot several major holes in the 
administration’s anti-terrorism positions,”78 most notably by holding 
that the President does not have “untrammeled power” to establish 
military commissions.79 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle created for the Government by the 
decision was the ruling that Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a detainee who 
was captured in Afghanistan during hostilities and who had asserted 
his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status under the Third Geneva 
Convention must have the benefit of a competent tribunal to deter-
mine whether he was entitled to such status.80  Determination that an 
individual was an enemy combatant made unilaterally by the Presi-
dent, pursuant to the Military Order, was insufficient to meet this re-
quirement.81  Likewise, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal did 
not meet the “competent tribunal” requirement because it was estab-
lished not to address detainees’ status under the Geneva Conven-
tions, but to comply with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Hamdi 
that, in order to continue detention, determination must be made that 
a detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant.82  Thus, 
Hamdan would be presumed to have prisoner-of-war status, unless or 
until it was shown to be otherwise.83 
However, even if Hamdan did not have prisoner-of-war status, 
the procedures used by Military Commissions may not be “contrary 
to or inconsistent with” the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
 
early 2005, two federal judges in the District of Columbia have issued conflicting opinions on 
the issue of whether detainees can substantively challenge their confinement as enemy combat-
ants.  Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005) (con-
cluding that petitioners had stated valid claims under the Fifth Amendment and that the proce-
dures set up by the government to make determinations regarding enemy combatant status 
violated petitioners’ due process rights) with Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 
2005) (concluding no viable theory exists under which habeas may be issued and dismissing peti-
tioners’ claims as a matter of law). 
 77. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 78. Marcia Coyle, Judging the Tribunals: Circuit to Weigh President’s Powers over Detain-
ees, NAT’L LAW J. Vol. 27, 1 (Nov. 22, 2004). 
 79. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 158. 
 80. Id. at 156. 
 81. Id. at 162 (“The President is not a ‘tribunal,’ however.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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(UCMJ).84  The District Court addressed the differences between the 
Military Commissions and the court-martial proceedings afforded 
under the UCMJ, finding remarkable differences in two important re-
spects.85  First, the Court briefly addressed the structure of the review-
ing authority after trial, finding that the lack of review provided by 
the judicial branch was not contrary to or inconsistent with the 
UCMJ.86  Further, the Court did not find problematic the fact that the 
President or Secretary of Defense are the final reviewing authority, as 
“that, after all, is what a military commission is.”87 
However, the second difference, the power to exclude the ac-
cused from hearings and deny access to evidence presented against 
him if it is deemed classified or otherwise protected, was found much 
more problematic.88  The Court identified contradictions between this 
procedural rule and the confrontation clause in American law,89 as 
well as the right to trial “in [one’s] presence” established by the Ge-
neva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the Geneva Convention (ICCPR).90  Because of these 
inconsistencies, the Court found the rules of the Military Commission 
unlawful, as they were “fatally ‘contrary to or inconsistent with’” the 
statutory requirements of the UCMJ.91 
Not surprisingly, this judgment caused outcry among members of 
the executive branch, who immediately sought expedited review of an 
appeal of the district court decision.92  It remains to be seen whether 
 
 84. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (allowing the President to prescribe pretrial, trial, and post-trial 
procedures for military commissions, so long as they are not “contrary to or inconsistent with” 
the UCMJ). 
 85. Id. at 166. 
 86. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 167.  The Court justified this, in part, based upon the panel 
of “some of the most distinguished civilian lawyers in the country” that have been appointed by 
the President as members of the Review Panel.  Id.  See also Dep’t of Defense, Military 
Commission Biographies, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_ 
biographies.html (listing members of the Review Panel). 
 87. Hamdan, 344 F.Supp. 2d at 167. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 168 (“It is obvious beyond the need for citation that such a dramatic deviation 
from the confrontation clause could not be countenanced in any American court . . . “). 
 90. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14.3(d), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au-
gust 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, art. 75.4(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 91. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 168. 
 92. See Coyle, supra note 78 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Peter Keisler as saying 
the rulings “‘represent an unprecedented judicial intrusion into the prerogatives of the presi-
dent’ and have ‘potentially very broad and dangerous ramifications’”); Dan Eggen, Ashcroft 
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the district court decision will withstand appellate scrutiny.  Counsel 
for Hamdan sought expedited review of petition for certiorari in the 
Supreme Court before judgment of the Court of Appeals, citing the 
extraordinary circumstances of the case, the importance of Military 
Commissions, and the tremendous significance of the decision of the 
District Court on other cases dealing with trial of detainees.93  The 
motion for expedited review was denied by the Supreme Court on 
December 6, 2004,94 and Hamdan’s petition for certiorari was denied 
on January 18, 2005.95  Oral arguments in front of the D.C. Circuit 
took place on April 7, 2005.96 
V.  POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL  
REVIEW OF GUANTANAMO COMMISSIONS 
The question of post-trial judicial review of the current Military 
Commissions is one that has not yet been addressed, most likely due 
to the delay in proceedings for the few detainees actually designated 
as eligible for trial.  As discussed, supra Part IV, case law dealing with 
the use of military commissions provides limited help in addressing 
the question of whether and how the courts may review decisions by 
the current Military Commissions, as those cases were decided in 
times of a declared war and when Congressional approval of the 
commissions more clearly existed. 
Furthermore, even the legal principles that may be taken from 
the World War II cases seem contradictory at times.  Often, even 
while professing that petitioners had no right to judicial review of 
their claims, the Court then went on to analyze and to rule on those 
claims nonetheless.  Because the Court held in favor of the Govern-
ment’s use of military commissions, the decision to review the gov-
ernmental action was non-controversial.  It is arguable that the Court 
 
Denies Court Rulings; ‘Second-Guessing’ Bush on Security Raises Risks, He Says, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 13, 2004, at A6 (quoting former Attorney General John Ashcroft as describing court deci-
sions limiting President Bush’s powers “a profoundly disturbing trend”). 
 93. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), petition for cert. 
filed, 2004 WL 2678664 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2004) (No. 04-702). 
 94. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), motion of petitioner to expe-
dite review, 73 USLW 3336 (Dec. 6, 2004) (No. 04-702). 
 95. Certiorari – Summary Dispositions (Order List: 543 U.S.), SUPREME COURT COURT 
ORDERS, Jan. 18, 2005, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/011805pzor.pdf. 
 96. See Transcript of Proceedings (Apr. 7, 2005), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-5393, (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Court of Appeals Transcript], available at http://www.law.georgetown. 
edu/faculty/nkk/documents/HamdanDCCircuitTranscript.PDF (last visited May 9, 2005). 
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addressed petitioner’s claims in each case merely to bolster its deci-
sion that judicial review was unnecessary and improper.97 
Thus, application of these cases and their principles to the cur-
rent commissions will not provide clear answers as to the Court’s 
proper jurisdiction in regards to post-trial review of the Guantanamo 
Commissions.  Already the Court has distinguished these cases, based 
on the geographical locations of the commissions and differences in 
the type of armed conflicts, to allow for habeas review for detention 
and pretrial proceedings.  Most recently, in Hamdan, the District 
Court of the District of Columbia has shown itself willing to take 
more than a perfunctory look at whether the authority and proce-
dures of the Military Commissions are proper under the constitution 
and under the UCMJ.98 
Therefore, at a minimum the level of judicial review that must be 
provided after the completion of a trial by the Military Commissions 
will consist of habeas review as to the legality of the authority and ju-
risdiction of the commission.  Based on the recent detainee cases, it 
seems likely that the federal courts will go further in their inquiry of 
the constitutionality of the commissions, to include the procedures 
used to reach final judgments.  Of course, legitimate concerns still ex-
ist in regards to allowing too much judicial oversight into the trial of 
suspected terrorists, the most compelling of which are the classified 
nature of much of the evidence and the security of judges and juries.99  
Such concerns provide support for judicial deference to military fact-
finding, yet courts should still retain authority to examine the validity 
of the commission procedures and decisions.100 
Such heightened inquiry into the constitutionality of both the ju-
risdiction and proceedings of the Guantanamo Military Commissions 
is not only permissible, but is also desirable, based upon the need to 
uphold separation of powers, to follow domestic and international 
laws of war and human rights, and for general policy reasons.  Each of 
these reasons will be discussed in detail below. 
 
 97. However, this approval based upon a review deferential to the Government was prob-
lematic in that it ignored glaring problems with the procedures employed by the commissions, as 
discussed infra at notes 125-128. 
 98. See supra notes 84–91. 
 99. See Ruth Wedgwood, Tribunals and the Events of September 11, ASIL INSIGHT, Dec. 
2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh80.htm. 
 100. Similar arguments support the judicial review of detainee classification procedures.  See 
generally David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The 
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 125 (2005) (exam-
ining the level of judicial review that should be afforded to enemy combatant classifications). 
LOHR1.DOC 9/15/2005  10:09 AM 
2005] A “FULL AND FAIR” TRIAL 403 
A. Separation of Powers 
The bounds of the President’s commander-in-chief powers are 
still being tested in regards to the current war on terror.  On one side, 
members of the Executive have stood by the position that the Presi-
dent’s discretion to act in protection of national security in the after-
math of September 11 must not be hampered.101  On the other side, 
many in the legal community as well as Congress have decried the 
President’s actions as circumventing the constitutional civil liberties 
and separation of powers.102 
Military Commissions have traditionally gained their legitimacy 
from Congressional grants of authority or, at least, from Congres-
sional approval of presidential action.103  Though a thorough evalua-
tion is not presented within this note, it is notable that the authority 
behind the current Military Commissions remains unclear.  While the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan provides the 
President latitude to take action in response to September 11, it con-
tains no authorization of the use of military commissions to try sus-
pected terrorists.104  Likewise sections 821 and 836 of the UCMJ estab-
lish the jurisdiction of military tribunals in general but do not give 
clear authorization for the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay 
Military Commissions.105 
Even assuming Congressional authorization, the Military Com-
missions, like other Article I tribunals, are necessarily inferior to the 
 
 101. See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 92 (detailing former Attorney General Ashcroft’s com-
ments that judicial review of presidential action in the area of national security creates even 
greater security risks).  See also Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A War the Courts 
Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at A17 (stating that, rather than fostering “the 
false impression that the executive branch is trampling on constitutional liberties,” the judiciary 
should defer to the executive branch’s “extensive prerogatives in foreign affairs [which] are 
grounded in its unique expertise, information and unitary nature”). 
 102. See Kate Martin, More Power for Bush: Alberto Gonzales Ordered Deference to the 
President, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at 45 (criticizing the President’s policy in Guantanamo 
Bay as having “engineered an extraordinary assumption of presidential power over the lives of 
individuals, unchecked by the separation of powers”); Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 
271–73 (comparing the reactions of Congress, the mainstream press and members of the legal 
academy to the current commissions with reactions to the 1942 commissions and finding the cur-
rent reaction by these institutions to be “vehement, and sometimes strident, opposition”).  For 
further examples of both viewpoints, see Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Bush Plan for Ter-
rorism Trials Defended; Military Tribunals Appropriate in War, Ashcroft Says; Critics Cite Con-
stitution, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A28. 
 103. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152, 158–60 (detailing Congressional author-
ity for World War II military commissions). 
 104. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2. 
 105. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2000). 
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head of the judiciary, the Supreme Court.106  A comparison can be 
drawn to the review provided by the Supreme Court to decisions by 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Article I tribunal es-
tablished by the UCMJ to hear appeals from courts-martial deci-
sions.107  Decisions are reviewed on a discretionary basis, on certiorari 
in the Supreme Court.108  Such review is consistent with the view that 
all tribunals established by Congress or the President, insofar as they 
perform adjudicatory functions, must be subject to review by the head 
of the judicial branch.109  Similar discretionary review for decisions of 
the Military Commissions by the Supreme Court, once all review 
within the chain of command has been exhausted, will provide neces-
sary balancing of powers. 
In addition to citing Acts of Congress as sources of authority, the 
Military Order also purports to derive authority from the President’s 
Article II commander-in-chief powers.110  Although it is clear that the 
President has the power and discretion to respond to the terrorist acts 
against the United States by apprehending those who would continue 
to threaten the nation, even in the most serious times of war execu-
tive commander-in-chief powers are not limitless.111  Most impor-
tantly, when the President acts in such a way that is “incompatible 
with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest 
ebb.”112  In such a situation, Presidential claims to power must be 
“scrutinized with caution” to prevent disruption of the balance of 
powers set out by the constitution.113 
As the President’s actions move from apprehending terrorists to 
adjudicating guilt and meting out punishment, it becomes more diffi-
 
 106. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the 
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 757 (2004). 
 107. 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2000); see also 10 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2000) (establishing jurisdiction of 
courts-martial over members of the armed forces).  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
has jurisdiction to review all cases carrying a death sentence, all cases reviewed by a Court of 
Criminal Appeals and has been referred for review by the Judge Advocate General, and those 
which it granted review upon petition of the accused and showing of good cause.  Id. 
 108. Pfander, supra note 106, at 754–55. 
 109. Id. at 722, 724. 
 110. Military Order, supra note 5, at pmbl. 
 111. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (stating that 
“Even though ‘theatre of war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our con-
stitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate 
power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stop-
ping production.”). 
 112. Id.. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 638. 
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cult to argue that these actions are within the perimeter of the com-
mander-in-chief powers.114  Further, with justice issued at a manipu-
lated locale and key decisions most likely being made in the United 
States rather than on the spur of the moment in the midst of hostili-
ties, the Executive’s claim for power to act without judicial review 
cannot be justified by claims of battlefield necessities.115  Thus, the 
federal courts should continue the practice of performing inquiry into 
the procedures taking place at Guantanamo Bay, especially in situa-
tions involving the trial, conviction, and sentencing of detained indi-
viduals.  Allowing for a more searching judicial review provides an-
other branch of government with some level of oversight of a process 
that has thus far, by most appearances, been controlled solely by a 
few within the executive branch.116  Given the uncertain nature of the 
balance of powers involved in the current Military Order and Com-
missions, a higher level of judicial review is thus needed to ensure the 
constitutionality of the proceedings. 
B. Rights of the Individual Under International Law 
Even if the constitutional system of separation of powers is not 
offended by the preclusion of all but the most limited judicial review, 
final reviewing authority placed solely in the hands of the President 
or the Secretary of Defense arguably violates trial rights protected by 
international humanitarian law.  Recognition and protection of indi-
vidual rights has evolved considerably since the decisions in the 
World War II commission cases,117 creating additional reasons to dis-
tinguish them from the current Commissions. 
 
 114. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2003-
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 56 (2004). 
 115. Amicus Brief of Military Commission Defense Attorneys, supra note 58, at 17–18. 
 116. Further, the possibility of this post-trial judicial review has been used by the govern-
ment as an argument in favor of allowing the Military Commission trials proceed without inter-
ruption by litigation in the federal courts.  Court of Appeals Transcript, supra note 96, at 5. 
 117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  While beyond the scope of this note, it is 
also notable that some have argued cases such as Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) and United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), provide support for the view that analysis 
should not focus on whether enemy aliens detained abroad have rights, but whether the U.S. 
government has any power to act inconsistently with the constitution.  Jordan J. Paust, Antiter-
rorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–20 (2001).  How-
ever, not all view such an interpretation positively.  See Katyal, supra 114, at 54–55, citing Rasul, 
124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15 (calling the Rasul majority’s application of statutory habeas and reference 
to Verdugo-Urquidez without qualification the “coup de grâce” of an overreaching opinion that 
may even go so far as to apply the Constitution to detainees). 
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Under Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, individuals outside the scope of protection of the Ge-
neva Conventions shall enjoy certain minimum protections, including 
conviction and sentence only by an “impartial and regularly consti-
tuted court” following “generalized recognized principles of regular 
judicial procedure.”118  Likewise, Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantees 
fair trial rights including hearing before a competent, independent, 
and impartial tribunal as well as review of convictions by “a higher 
tribunal according to law.”119 
Although the treaty provisions may be derogated, Article 4 of 
the ICCPR limits situations in which signatories may derogate their 
responsibilities under the treaty to emergency situations, where no-
tice is given, and where derogation is proportional to the emer-
gency.120  The guaranty of trial rights could not be derogated to carry 
out trials by Military Commissions in this case, however, as Article 4 
requires that an emergency and the corresponding derogation must 
be temporary in nature, and thus is not satisfied by a “permanent risk 
of international terrorism.”121 
Therefore, under international law, the United States is required 
to provide an independent and regularly constituted tribunal, even to 
unprivileged combatants, if it seeks to try those individuals for of-
fenses related to an armed conflict.  From a technical standpoint, as 
military tribunals are ad hoc and set up only for a specific purpose, it 
is questionable whether they would be considered “regularly consti-
tuted” tribunals.122  Further, the procedures set up to try detainees by 
the Military Commission involve adjudication and post-trial review by 
the same military authority that captured and labeled them as enemy 
combatants, thus utilizing a tribunal that is seemingly not very inde-
pendent at all.123  This lack of independence is most poignant in re-
 
 118. Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 75(4).  The United States has not ratified the Protocol, 
however it accepts many of its provisions, including Article 75, as declaratory of customary law.  
Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Ter-
rorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 661 (2001). 
 119. ICCPR, supra note 90, art. 14.5. 
 120. Id. at art. 4. 
 121. Fitzpatrick, supra note 59, at 350–51. 
 122. Michael Ratner, Moving Away From the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive 
Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2003). 
 123. See Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 118, at 659–60.  See also Neil A. Lewis, General 
Takes Three Officers Off Tribunal At Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A21 (listing con-
flicts of interest which led to dismissal of judges from Commission, such as the supervision of an 
operation which sent suspected terrorists from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay and service as 
an intelligence officer in Iraq, while noting that a Marine Colonel who had lost one of his reserv-
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gards to the authority of the President or Secretary of Defense to per-
form final review of all decisions, especially in light of the power 
given to the President to determine likely membership in al Qaeda, 
enemy combatant status, and eligibility for trial by commission pursu-
ant to the Military Order. 
Thus, assuming that the trials continue before the Military 
Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, judicial review by an independent 
court, whether Article I or Article III, could act to satisfy interna-
tional requirements for independent and regularly constituted tribu-
nals.  Such review would provide a check against any partiality on the 
part of military judges,124 as well as fulfill both the letter and spirit of 
the nation’s international obligations. 
C. General Policy Concerns 
Finally, other general policy arguments support a greater role for 
the courts in reviewing the military tribunals.  First, providing judicial 
review offers a way to legitimize a process that has thus far been con-
troversial both at home and abroad.  Such legitimacy would be valu-
able not only for the commissions themselves, but for the convictions 
and sentences that may be handed out at trial.  Court approval – after 
a thorough inquiry, rather than a perfunctory glance – that full and 
fair trials were provided can go a long way in providing this legiti-
macy. 
History has shown that allowing only superficial review by the 
judicial branch will not guaranty that military commissions operate 
according to proper judicial principles.  Whether or not justice was 
served by the final outcomes of Quirin and Yamashita, deference to 
the procedures followed by the Government was later a source of re-
gret for members the Court.125  Especially in Yamashita and its com-
 
ists in the attack on the World Trade Center and an Army Colonel who was a “longtime close 
friend” of the Appointing Authority were challenged but not dismissed); but see Hamdan, 344 
F. Supp. 2d at 167 & n.13 (pointing to the fact that “some of the most distinguished civilian law-
yers in the country” had been appointed to constitute the Review Panel). 
 124. Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 118, at 662. 
 125. See Tony Mauro, A Mixed Precedent for Military Tribunals: 1942 Case of Nazis on U.S. 
Soil Gives Administration the Authority for Terrorist Trials, but Leaves Room for Doubt, LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 15. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (referring to Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour”); Orentlicher & Goldman, su-
pra note 118, at 657 (“Much like [Korematsu], Quirin has long been criticized as an abdication 
of independent judicial judgment during war time and an unwarranted surrender of constitu-
tional rights.”). 
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panion case, In re Homma,126 the trial procedures used to convict and 
sentence defendants to death were antithetical to even the most basic 
principles of our justice system,127 and it is perhaps telling that criti-
cisms of these procedures were often espoused by those justices who 
dissented from the holding that the Supreme Court lacked authority 
to review the quality of justice in military tribunals.128 
As the recent detainee cases have shown, today’s federal courts 
seem unlikely to follow the “virtual hands-off” approach of Yama-
shita and Homma.129  Even the performance of deferential review of 
the procedures and decisions of military commissions can have the ef-
fect of compelling the commissions to honor the trial rights of detain-
ees,130 as the procedures followed and the level of protections afforded 
to detainees are not only scrutinized by the courts but evaluated for 
all to read in published judicial opinions. 
Second, and undoubtedly a more important issue in the minds of 
many Americans, is the protection of the nation’s own citizens and 
troops abroad by upholding international standards for fair trials of 
 
 126. 327 U.S. 759 (1946). 
 127. In Yamashita, the Commander was charged with failing to control the atrocities com-
mitted by his troops, a charge which left the commission “free to establish whatever standard of 
duty on petitioner’s part it desired.” 327 U.S. at 40 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Further, “the sole 
proof of knowledge introduced at trial was in the form of ex parte affidavits and depositions” 
which allowed no opportunity for cross-examination.  Id. at 53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  In 
Homma, the commission allowed forced confessions to be received into evidence and required 
that findings made in a group trial for mass offenses be given full faith and credit in any subse-
quent trial of an individual member of the group.  327 U.S. at 761–62 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  
In both cases, the time allowed for preparation of the defense was less than a month between 
arraignment and beginning of trial, and defense attorneys’ motions for continuance for more 
preparation were denied.  Id. at 762. 
 128. See Warren Richey, Tribunals on Trial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1. 
 129. See Martin, supra note 100, at 146–47 (stating that unlike the Yamashita court’s refusal 
to address tribunal decisions regarding disputed facts, today’s courts “will rather plainly pre-
serve some judicial role in considering the validity of the factual findings,” in regards to pro-
ceedings that determine enemy combatant status). 
 130. See id. at 135–36 (finding that judicial review of enemy combatant status determina-
tions would provide “significant incentives” for those making such determinations, as well as 
“provid[e] a genuine check on improper executive action”).  Professor Martin acknowledges 
that judicial review of military tribunals “is hardly a tidy system,” id. at 159, yet finds this bene-
ficial for the process of establishing procedures to determine enemy combatant status: 
[A] portion of the stimulus for the military to develop and sustain the right kind of 
administrative process, with serious internal checks and balances, depends at least in 
part on the military’s risk, in any given case, of encountering a cowboy district judge 
whose intrusions are supposedly precluded by the deferential standards that are to 
govern review. 
Id.  A similar argument can be made for the establishment and execution of trial procedures in 
the Military Commissions. 
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foreign combatants.  In the past, even where not legally required to, 
adherence to the Geneva Conventions and other human rights pro-
tections has benefited the United States by impacting the treatment 
its own soldiers received from the enemy in armed conflicts.131  On the 
other hand, the failure of the United States to offer protections in re-
gards to fair trial and other human rights issues will act as encour-
agement and justification for other nations to follow suit.132 
Finally, for each of these goals, it is “not only crucial that the tri-
bunals meet both American and international standards of justice . . . 
it is also essential that they are perceived to do so.”133  Thus, it may 
not matter whether the Military Commissions are legally authorized 
and exercising their jurisdiction, nor whether members constitute bi-
ased military officers seeking only to eradicate their enemies or dis-
tinguished attorneys from the civilian and military fields.  Rather, the 
mere appearance of impropriety, secrecy, or sham victor’s justice – 
whether accurate or not – will be enough to condemn the use of Mili-
tary Commissions in the eyes of the world.  For these policy reasons, 
thorough judicial review in an independent, civilian court is desirable 
and necessary.  “[T]he United States has told the world that it is fight-
ing terrorism for democratic values and freedom.  Certain forms of 
military commissions appear to be most inappropriate in view of what 
the United States stands for and what it has told the world it is fight-
ing for and against.”134 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current detention and prosecution of foreign combatants by 
the United States in the War on Terror raises innumerable legal is-
sues about our constitutional system of separation of powers, individ-
 
 131. See Brief of Amicus of General David M. Brahms (ret.), Admiral Lee F. Gunn (ret.), 
Admiral John D. Hutson (ret.), and General Richard O’Meara (ret.) at 2–7, Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 125 S. Ct. 972 (2004) (No. 04-702) (providing evidence that adherence to the Geneva Con-
vention resulted in lower U.S. casualties during past armed conflicts). 
 132. See id. at 8 (listing examples of nations who have cited United States policy to justify 
their own repressive policies since September 11, 2001).  In fact, the very term “Guantanamo” 
has become a “metonym for the treatment of captives” during the war on terror, now encom-
passing “not only U.S. treatment of suspected enemies overseas and at home, but also U.S. con-
cern about others’ treatment of American’s abroad.”  Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 265 (2004). 
 133. Nyier Abdou, What’s Good for the Goose . . . , AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, July 31, 2003 
(quoting Kevin Barry, a legal expert at the National Institute of Military Justice), available at 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/649/in5.htm. 
 134. Paust, supra note 117, at 10. 
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ual rights, and role of the nation in acting as a protector of democratic 
values and freedoms.  Key to the War on Terror, as well as the con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the apprehension of suspected ter-
rorists.  Further, in the aftermath of September 11, bringing such ter-
rorists to justice is an important goal in maintaining peace and safety 
within the nation. 
Given this changing landscape, it is not surprising that old cases 
and norms no longer provide the same clarity in regards to the legal-
ity of adjudicating the guilt of enemy combatants and meting just 
punishments.  Though the President may exercise discretion in deal-
ing with the threat and prosecution of terrorists, it must not be done 
at the expense of constitutional separation of powers, individual 
rights, or international norms.  Thus the Judicial Branch must play a 
role in evaluating and reviewing the proceedings of the Military 
Commissions and ensuring detainees receive the proper protections 
under the law. 
While the future of the Military Commissions and other proce-
dures at Guantanamo Bay remain unclear, one thing is certain.  In 
creating policies for handling terrorism and national security, the 
United States changes not only its own practices, but creates norms 
for other nations to follow.  Thus, at a time in which new democracies 
hope to emerge in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is crucial that the United 
States maintain its position as a nation guided by the rule of law. 
